Managing Labor under Monetary Instability by Held, Karina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Managing Labor under Monetary Instability -  
Experimental Evidence on Wage and Effort Inertia
Karina Held/Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Working Paper No. 12/2017
 Impressum (§ 5 TMG)  
Herausgeber:  
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg  
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft  
D?? Dekan  
 
Verantwortlich für diese Ausgabe:  
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg 
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
Postfach 4120  
39016 Magdeburg  
Germany  
http://www.?ww.???????/femm
Bezug über den Herausgeber 
ISSN 1615-4274 
Karina Held and Abdolkarim Sadrieh
1 
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Abstract 
In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the impact of monetary instability on work relationships 
with incomplete contracts. We observe wage inertia, i.e. the reluctance to fully adjust nominal wages to the 
changes in the value of the currency, and effort inertia, i.e. the reluctance to fully adjust the work effort to 
the alterations of the real wages. Under inflation, these effects lead to cheaper labor and a shift of payoff 
shares to employers. Under deflation, we observe a higher cost of labor and a shift of payoff shares to 
employees. Additionally, inflation and deflation lower productivity and per capita earnings. 
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1. Introduction 
Organization science and behavioral economics are relatively mute on the effects that monetary 
instability may have on the interplay of wages, effort, and productivity in reciprocal labor relationships.2 
This is especially astonishing since many labor relationships are trust-based with incomplete contracts in 
nominal terms.3 Monetary instability can affect these relationships, because fluctuations in the value of the 
currency may induce contract renegotiations that provide opportunities for self-interested behavior and can 
be disruptive to the trust relationship. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental study investigating 
the effect of monetary instability on wage and effort choices in reciprocal labor relationships.4 Using 
controlled variations of the value of the experimental currency, we observe and analyze labor productivity 
and the distribution of earnings with inflation, deflation, and monetary stability.  
When contracts are in nominal terms, monetary instability creates incentives to adjust contracted wages. 
If the ensuing nominal adjustment is not to the full extent, real wages fall under inflation and increase under 
deflation. Outside the lab, there are two ways in which nominal wages adjustments can be insufficient. 
First, wages may be only partially adapted to changes in the real factor markets. There is a rather large 
literature on the nominal downward wage rigidity that discusses employer’s reluctance to adjust wages 
downwards when facing a change in real factor markets, e.g. a surplus of labor supply in a recession. Our 
experiment does not study this first type of nominal wage rigidity that is linked to fluctuations in the factor 
markets and is often referred to as wage stickiness.  
We study the second type of nominal wage rigidity that we call wage inertia. It describes the incomplete 
adjustment of wages to purely monetary fluctuations (i.e. it can occur even if the factor markets are stable). 
The literature on wage inertia is generally concerned with incomplete wage adjustments under inflation. In 
these situations, deferred nominal wage adjustment may lead to decreasing real wages, making labor 
cheaper compared to other input factors, but at the same time reducing incentives to work and shifting 
earnings from employees to employers.  
The literature discusses several reasons why nominal wage adjustments may be limited or slow. On the 
one hand, informational frictions (Lucas, 1972), staggered contracts (Fisher, 1977; Taylor, 1979), menu 
costs (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985; Mankiw, 1985), and reciprocity towards employees (Akerlof, 1982; 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993; Campbell and Kamlani, 1997; 
Bewley, 1998; Fehr and Gächter, 2000) have been suggested as possible reasons both for sticky wages and 
                                                 
2 At the same time, there is a plethora of studies  covering the interplay of inflation, growth, and unemployment in the macroeconomic literature 
(for an overview see Blanchard 1990). 
3 The literature on incomplete labor contracts is vast. Fehr and Gächter (2000) provide an excellent point of entry. 
4 Reviewing theoretical and empirical literature on wage setting behavior, Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009) find that the connection between 
monetary instability and reciprocal labor relationships remains an important open issue. 
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for wage inertia. On the other hand, money illusion – sometimes also referred to as nominal illusion – 
(Blinder and Choi, 1990; Kahn, 1997; Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky, 1997; Fehr and Tyran, 2001; Fehr 
and Tyran, 2008) is mainly discussed in the context of wage or price inertia in inflation.5 
While there is some empirical evidence on wage inertia, it is rather difficult to control for all aspects of 
the labor relationships in the field. Identification is especially difficult, because wages, effort choices, and 
inflation rates tend to be highly correlated in field data. Our experimental approach allows us to circumvent 
the empirical measurement obstacles. In our setup, monetary instability (i.e. the alteration of the real value 
of the experimental currency) is fully controlled and exogenous. We induce inflation and deflation scenarios 
by varying the exchange rate between the experimental currency unit and the real payment in Euro. This 
allows us to compare employer and employee behavior in three treatments: Control (full monetary 
stability), Inflation (the real value of the experimental currency decreases over time), and Deflation (the 
real value of the experimental currency unit increases over time). 
We observe wage inertia in both settings with monetary instability, i.e. nominal wages increase slower 
than the inflation rate in Inflation and they decrease slower than the deflation rate in Deflation. Additionally, 
we also find clear evidence for the reluctance of employees to adjust their chosen efforts to the real wages 
they are offered. We call this behavioral phenomenon effort inertia. Note that this aspect of labor 
relationships has not been reported in the literature so far.  
Overall, wage and effort inertia in Inflation lead to cheaper labor (i.e. a decreasing real wage per effort 
ratio) and a shift of payoff shares from employees to employers, but also to less productivity and lower per 
capita earnings than in Control. In Deflation, wage and effort inertia lead to a higher cost of labor (i.e. an 
increasing real wage per effort ratio), to a shift of payoff shares from employers to employees, to slightly 
less productivity, and to lower per capita earnings than in Control. All in all, we find that monetary 
instability leads to the predicted cost of labor effects both under inflation and under deflation. However, 
since productivity adapts to the real wages changes (albeit with a deferred reaction due to effort inertia), 
neither inflation nor deflation can generate positive effects on the real economy. To the contrary, both 
inflation and deflation burden the trust-based labor relationships and lower per capita earnings. 
Our study contributes to the literature on behavioral sources of nominal rigidity, i.e. the deferred 
adjustment to changes of real values that are not reflected in nominal values (e.g. money illusion). Our 
results are generally well in line with the findings of Fehr and Tyran (2001 and 2008), who provide 
laboratory evidence for the deferred adjustment of market prices to monetary fluctuations. Our results go 
beyond those findings by providing evidence for the nominal rigidity of wage and effort choices in work 
relationships with incomplete contracts.  
                                                 
5 Note however, that this literature generally does not consider the link between wages, work incentives, and productivity on firm level. 
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2. Experimental Design 
We use a classical gift exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993) to investigate the influence 
of inflation and deflation on wage and effort choices in labor relationships with incomplete contracts.6 In 
this study, we induce monetary instability by varying the exchange rate between the experimental currency 
and the real currency paid to the subjects at the end of the experiment.  
 
A. Treatments and the Game 
Table I shows the three treatments in our study. The first treatment is our control treatment, in which the 
exchange rate remains stable throughout all 20 rounds. In our second treatment, Inflation, the exchange rate 
is stable for the first 6 rounds, but increases by 10 percent in each round from round 7 to 20. In Deflation, 
our third treatment, the exchange rate also remains stable in the first 6 rounds, but decreases by 10 percent 
in each round from round 7 to 20. Subjects are informed at the outset of the experiment that the exchange 
rate may vary over the rounds, but they do not know the long-term pattern of exchange rate development 
in their treatments. However, the exchange rate of the current round is announced at the beginning of each 
round, i.e. before the subjects make their decisions. Hence, even though subjects do not know the long-term 
development of exchange rates, they are fully aware of the exchange rate that is relevant for their decisions 
in the current round. Note that the three treatments are identical in rounds 1-6. Participants of all treatments 
also received the identical instructions (see the Appendix). 
 
TABLE I: TREATMENTS 
Treatment Exchange Rate Development # subjects # ind. obs. 
rounds 1-6 rounds 7-20 
Control Constant Constant 60 15 
Inflation Constant  +10 % per round  60 15 
Deflation Constant  –10 % per round  60 15 
Total 180 45 
 
We study a gift exchange game with one employer and three employees (? ? ???????). In this version of 
the game, the employer incurs a loss when the sum of effort choices is smaller than the total amount of real 
                                                 
6 The gift-exchange paradigm has been used to study work relationships with incomplete contracts under a number of market conditions. Riedl 
and Tyran (2005) study the influence of different taxation regimes. Brandts and Charness (2004) study fluctuations in supply and demand of labor. 
For an extensive survey of the laboratory studies, see Casoria and Riedl (2013). Reciprocal work relationships are also observed under various 
conditions in the field (e.g. Gneezy and List, 2006; Hennig-Schmidt, Sadrieh, and Rockenbach, 2010; Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe, 2013; Cohn, 
Fehr, and Goette, 2015; Gilchrist, Luca, and Malhotra, 2016). The results of those studies, however, are generally not as clear cut as in the laboratory, 
due to the substantially greater difficulties to control the exogenous influences.    
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wages.7 The employer deals with each of the three work relationships independently. In the first stage of 
the game, the employer decides which of the three employees to hire (?? ? ?). Employees who are not 
hired (?? ? ?) receive an unemployment benefit of Euro 0.10. While the real value of the unemployment 
benefit remains constant, the nominal amount of the unemployment benefit payment varies with the 
exchange rate.  
All hired employees learn the total number of hires. Each hired employee receives an individual wage 
offer from the employer. Subsequently, each employee i who received a wage offer either rejects (ri=1) or 
accepts (ri=0) the wage offer. Both the employer and the employee receive zero earnings from the work 
relationship if the employee rejects the wage offer. However, the employer may receive earnings from her 
work relationships with the other hires. In case the employee i accepts the wage offer, he must choose an 
effort level ei between 10 and 100, for which he incurs a non-linear, monotonously increasing cost of effort 
c(ei). The cost of effort may be based on any type of physical or psychological strain as well as all kinds of 
opportunity costs. In the model, we aggregate all these costs of exerting effort and present the total cost of 
effort in currency units. Without monetary instability, the cost of effort is: 
???????? ? ?
?? ? ????? ???????????
?? ? ????? ???????????
??? ? ????? ????????????
 
 
Starting in round 7, we introduce a constant inflation (deflation) rate of 10% (-10%). In these rounds, 
while the cost of effort physically and in real terms remains unchanged, its evaluation in nominal terms 
changes from round to round:  
??????????? ? ???????? ? ?? 
Where ?? represents the scaling parameter: 
?? ? ?
?? ? ??????? ????????????
?? ? ??????? ??? ????????
 
Table II exhibits the cost of effort in real and nominal terms for selected values of effort:8 
 
TABLE II: COST OF EFFORT c(ei) 
                                                 
7 Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) use a similar game with two players and a labor market. Maximiano, Sloof, and Sonnemans (2007) use a five-
player version of the game with one employer and four employees but without a labor market. Gose and Sadrieh (2014) use a 13-player version 
without a labor market. 
8 The cost of effort schedule that we use corresponds to the schedule used in most of the experimental gift exchange literature following Fehr 
et al. (1993). While effort has to be a multiple of 10 in most existing studies, we allow employees to pick any integer value of effort between 10 
and 100. 
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rounds 1-6           
effort ei 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
c(e) Real=Nominal 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
rounds 7-20           
effort ei 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
c(e)real 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
c(e)nominal 0 1·kt 2·kt 4·kt 6·kt 8·kt 10·kt 12·kt 15·kt 18·kt 
 
rounds t 1 ... 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
kt Inflation 1 ... 1 1.10 1.21 1.33 1.46 1.61 1.77 1.95 2.14 2.36 2.59 2.85 3.14 3.45 3.80 
kt Deflation 1 … 1 0.90 0.81 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.53 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.23 
 
 
An employee’s nominal round income depends on the nominal wage offer and the cost of effort, if a work 
contract is offered and accepted, the unemployment benefit, if no work contract is offered, and zero if the 
work contract is offered but rejected: 
?????????????????????????
??????? ? ?
????????? ? ????????? ? ?? ????? ? ???????? ? ?
? ? ?? ????? ? ?
? ????
 
 
Nominal employer income accrues from all work relationships in which the wage offers are accepted. It 
amounts to the sum of the effort choices’ values in nominal terms minus the total amount of nominal wages: 
??????????????????????
?????? ? ???? ? ?? ? ??????????
?
???
? ?? ? ?? ? ??? 
 
Note that effort, cost of effort, and unemployment benefit are automatically and fully adjusted to the 
exchange rate variation i.e. real effort, real cost of effort, and real unemployment benefit are constant 
throughout the game. Wages, on the other hand, may vary throughout the game both in real and nominal 
terms, because the employer decides whether and to what extent to take the variation of the exchange rate 
into consideration when choosing the wage offer.9  
                                                 
9 As usual in gift exchange games of this type, in the only equilibrium with positive payoffs, the employers pay the minimum positive wage and 
the employees choose the smallest possible effort level. This is true for all rounds in all treatments.  
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To simplify the conversion of nominal into real terms, we provide a calculator in the interface of the 
experimental software. All participants can check the payoff consequences of different wage-effort 
combinations both in nominal (i.e. experimental currency units) and real terms (i.e. Euros). Participants 
also receive information on the last round’s nominal wage and effort choices (employers see this 
information for all employees of their firm; an employee only sees his own last round information). 
At the end of each round, the employer is informed of all effort levels chosen by the employees, the 
wages paid and all payoffs. Each employee observes his own wage as well as his own and the employer’s 
payoff. Again, all payoffs are displayed in terms of nominal and real values. The employees do not observe 
each other’s individual wage offers, effort choices, or payoffs. Note that an employer does not know the 
nominal wage levels of employees with whom she does not engage in a work relationship. Thus, one 
employer cannot imitate wage decisions from other employers. Therefore, imperfect wage adjustments 
cannot spread between employers. 
 
B. Experimental Procedure  
We recruited subjects using Orsee (Greiner, 2015). All participants were university students with a major 
or a minor in economics or management. Participants were randomly assigned to visually isolated cubicles 
in the laboratory and had no possibility to identify each other’s roles in the experiment. Since the number 
of participants in a session was much larger than the number of players in a single firm (one employer and 
three employees), subjects could not determine those who were in their independent interaction group.  
Instructions for the experiment were distributed to the subjects and read aloud. Subjects’ questions were 
answered individually in the cubicles according to a standard protocol that allowed only explanations of 
the game but no suggestions on behavior or outcomes.  
The experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The game was played for 20 rounds 
in the same matching groups. The sum of earnings over all rounds was paid individually to each participant 
after the experiment. Each session lasted about 60 minutes with earnings ranging between 1.60 Euro and 
28.40 Euro.10 
 
C. Hypotheses 
We derive our first hypothesis (H1) based on the wage inertia literature (see section 1). We assert that on 
average employers fail to adjust nominal wages sufficiently to counterbalance exchange rate variations. 
Wage inertia leads to different consequences in the three treatments. In Control, it obviously plays no role, 
                                                 
10 1 Euro = 1.2967 USD at the time of the experiment. 
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because the stable exchange rate leaves nominal and real wages equal throughout the experiment. In 
Inflation (Deflation), nominal wage inertia leads to decreasing (increasing) real wages. 
In line with nominal loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Genesove and Mayer, 2001), empirical 
evidence suggests reluctance to nominal wage cuts. In fact, with incomplete contracts in labor relationships 
reciprocity may enhance downward wage inertia (Akerlof, 1982; Fehr et al., 1993; Campbell and Kamlani, 
1997; Bewley, 1998; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). However, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) provide 
evidence that workers may consider wage cuts fair when firm profits are threatened. Thus, in Deflation, 
where incomplete nominal wage adjustments can lead to firm bankruptcy, wage inertia may be less 
pronounced than in Inflation, where the negative effect of the incomplete nominal wage adjustment is 
spread over all employees and – due to the reduced incentives to work – partially shifted to the firm, 
reducing the employer’s profits.11  
H1: (Wage Inertia) Nominal wage adjustments are less pronounced than the exogenous exchange rate 
variations. 
H1a: (Downward Nominal Wage Adjustment) In Deflation, nominal wage adjustments are closer to the 
exogenous exchange rate variations than in Inflation. 
We may also observe inertia in the behavior of employees. In this case, we expect a reluctance to adjust 
effort choices to the preceding real wage change (H2). Effort inertia, in combination with wage inertia, 
leads to reduced employee earnings in Inflation. The literature on loss aversion suggests that employees 
will try to avoid these losses by adjusting their effort to the new real wage. Hence, there is reason to believe 
that we will observe little effort inertia in Inflation. However, in Deflation, the combined effects of effort 
and wage inertia lead to increased employee earnings. Thus, effort inertia may be pronounced in Deflation. 
This leads us to a second hypothesis on effort inertia, H2a. 
H2: (Effort Inertia) Effort choice adjustment is less pronounced than the preceding real wage variation.  
H2a: (Upward Effort Inertia) Effort choice adjustment is more pronounced in Inflation than in Deflation. 
An alternative to H2a arises from the literature on money illusion, which suggests that both real and 
nominal representations of payoffs have real consequences. Changes in nominal terms should not lead to a 
distortion of real consequences, if all agents are fully informed and rational. However, studies have found 
money illusion to be a driver for boundedly rational human behavior (e.g. Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky, 
1997; Fehr and Tyran, 2001). Although nominal and real presentations describe an identical situation, 
decision makers are biased towards a nominal evaluation. Given our argumentation following H1a, we 
                                                 
11 Another possible reason for wage inertia is the cognitive cost of nominal wage adjustment. If we observe long sequences of play in which 
wages are not changed, we can conclude that wage inertia (at least partially) is due to this type of “menu cost.” However, the frequent nominal 
wage adjustments that we observe in the experiment (and that are insufficient to neutralize the exchange rate fluctuations) are not in line with menu 
cost minimization.  
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expect nominal wages to increase in Inflation. This increase, however, will not be strong enough to match 
the exogenous exchange rate variation and, thus, will decrease employees’ real wage offers. If employees 
are prone to money illusion (i.e. take nominal variations into account, when making their effort choices), 
we may observe real wages per unit of effort that are smaller in Inflation than in Deflation. Thus, H3 arises: 
H3: (Money Illusion) Employees in Inflation take both real and nominal values of wage offers into 
account when choosing their effort response. 
So far, our hypotheses suggest that the real cost of labor will be lowest under inflation and highest under 
deflation. With effort inertia in place, this will lead to higher employer earnings in Inflation than in 
Deflation (H4) when measured in real terms. On the other hand, we expect real employee earnings to be 
lower in Inflation than in Deflation (H5). 
H4: (Employer Income) Real employer earnings are greater in Inflation than in Deflation. 
H5: (Employee Income) Real employee earnings are greater in Deflation than in Inflation. 
Since we assume that wage and effort inertia lead to the lowest real wage per effort unit in Inflation, 
hiring workers is less costly than in the other two treatments. Hence, we hypothesize that employers in 
Inflation hire more workers than in the other treatments, i.e. there are less workers who are not offered a 
work contract in Inflation (H6). This hypothesis is in line with the evidence indicating that downward 
nominal wage rigidity fuels unemployment (Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry, 1996; Fehr and Goette, 2005; 
Dickens et al., 2006; Fehr et al., 2009). 
H6: (Cost of Labor) More workers are offered a work contract in Inflation than in Control or Deflation. 
While H6 stipulates that there are more contract offers in Inflation, the number of rejected work contracts 
might actually be at its highest level, because real wages may be low enough to impede stable gift exchange 
relationships (see e.g. Fehr et al. 1993). This leads us to H7. 
H7: (Opportunity cost of Employment) In Inflation, the number of rejected work contracts is highest. 
 
3. Results 
A. The Wage-Effort Relationship 
Experimental studies of the gift exchange game generally show a strong and positive correlation between 
wages and effort choices. The left panel of Figure I shows that we replicate this result in our control 
treatment. The rank correlation between wages and effort level choices for all hires (i.e. accepted labor 
contracts) in Control is at about 94% (one-tailed spearman rank correlation,  = 0.939, significant at the 
1% level). Average wages start at about 30 and rise to about 50 in the course of the game. Average effort 
choices start at around 40 and rise to 70 in the second half of the experiment. In fact, we find a significant 
increase of wages and effort choices over time (one-tailed spearman correlations, 
effort
?
??????????
wage
? ?????, both significant at the 1% level). We observe an end effect (i.e. a breakdown in 
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cooperation) in round 20 both in wages and effort choices. Even though the end effect is rather moderate, 
we do not use the round 20 data in our regression analyses.12  
The right panel in Figure I shows average effort choices for ten different wage brackets over all rounds 
of the game. The size of the circles indicates the number of work relationships with wage offers within the 
ten brackets. While wage-effort combinations above the diagonal are profitable for the employers (the 
farther above the line, the higher the average employer earnings), wage-effort combinations below the line 
are not. Clearly, all real wage brackets except the top bracket are profitable for the employers in Control. 
 
  
FIGURE I: DEVELOPMENT OF WAGES AND EFFORT CHOICES IN CONTROL (ALL ACCEPTED HIRES) 
 
  
FIGURE II: DEVELOPMENT OF WAGES AND EFFORT CHOICES IN INFLATION (ALL ACCEPTED HIRES) 
 
 
FIGURE III: DEVELOPMENT OF WAGES AND EFFORT CHOICES IN DEFLATION (ALL ACCEPTED HIRES) 
 
                                                 
12 We ran all analyses with and without the round 20 data. Significant results are not affected in any way by including or excluding that data. 
Nevertheless, we choose to omit round 20 data and include round 7 – 19 data to retain unbiased quantitative estimates of effect sizes. 
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We also find the reciprocal relationship of wage and effort choices in Inflation and Deflation (one-tailed 
spearman correlation coefficients, ????????? ? ????? and ????????? ? ?????, both significant at 1%). As 
the left panels in Figures II and III show, effort choices seem to follow the path of real wages after round 
7. However, we also see that the effort profile in Inflation lies farther above the real wage profile than it is 
the case in Deflation where the two profiles seem to move closer to each other. This hints at the type of 
deferred adaptation process we describe in our hypotheses. In both treatments, nominal wages and effort 
choices are not adjusted at a pace that would keep the gap between effort choices and real wages stable over 
time. Thus, the visual inspection seems to confirm wage and effort inertia according to hypotheses H1 and 
H2 both in Inflation and in Deflation. The right sides of Figures II and III support these findings. In Inflation, 
we observe only very few work relationships in which real wages above 50 are offered, while in Deflation 
we observe the entire wage spectrum with average wage offers being similarly distributed (Table III shows 
averaged real values for wages, effort, cost per unit of effort and earnings). We observe that wage-effort 
combinations in Inflation lie well above the diagonal (Figure II, right panel) in contrast to the wage-effort 
combinations in Deflation which are close to the diagonal (Figure III, right panel), indicating substantially 
higher employer earnings in Inflation than in Deflation.  
 
TABLE III: AVERAGE WAGES, EFFORT CHOICES, COST PER UNIT OF EFFORT, AND EARNINGS FOR ALL TREATMENTS (ROUNDS 7-19) 
Treatment Real Wage Effort Real Cost per Unit of Effort Real Earnings 
    Employer Employee 
Control 42.93 58.31 1.50 41.86 34.52 
Inflation 25.64 43.96 1.96 49.51 20.32 
Deflation 47.02 55.74 1.34 22.78 39.11 
 
Average effort levels are highest in Control and lowest in Inflation – this difference is significant (one-
sided U-Test, p = 0.004). Effort in Inflation is also significantly smaller than in Deflation (one-sided U-
Test, p = 0.028) while there is no significant treatment difference concerning work effort between Control 
and Deflation. We further find that average real wages in Inflation are significantly smaller than in the other 
two treatments (one-sided U-Tests, p = 0.002 (difference to Control), p = 0.000 (difference to Deflation)).  
Since nominal wages are not perfectly adjusted to the exchange rate variation, we find treatment effects 
on real wages. The results of a random effects13 regression (Table IV) indicate that real wages are decreasing 
over time in Inflation (interaction term between treatment dummy and round is significantly negative), 
while in Deflation the pattern of real wages follows that in Control (interaction term between treatment 
dummy and round is not significantly different from zero). 
 
                                                 
13 All our models are clustered at the employer level and standard errors are cluster robust. 
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TABLE IV: DEVELOPMENT OF REAL WAGES OVER TIME 
Real Wage Coef. Robust Std.Err. P>|z| 
Constant 12.502 3.529 0.000 
Round 0.489 0.194 0.012 
Inflation 4.919 4.806 0.306 
Deflation 6.390 6.481 0.324 
Inflation x Round -1.329 0.276 0.000 
Deflation x Round -0.100 0.394 0.799 
Effort Previous Round 0.441 0.036 0.000 
Random effects regression, N = 1,567, Wald chi2(6) = 438.800, Prob > chi2 = 0.000, R-sq overall = 0.604; 45 groups. Inflation x Round - Deflation 
x Round = 0: chi2(1) = 9.460, Prob > chi2 = 0.002. 
 
Calculating the logarithmic nominal wage adjustments from one round to the next allows us to further 
examine wage inertia in our treatments with nominal instability. We find that the average nominal wage 
adjustments in Inflation and Deflation equal 6.42% and -2.68%, respectively, i.e. employers in Inflation 
fail to adjust the nominal wage to the increase in the exchange rate by 3.58% while employers in Deflation 
fail to adjust the nominal wage to the decrease in the exchange rate by 7.32%. A one-sided U-test shows 
that the treatment difference in failure to adjustment to the previous exchange rate variation is statistically 
insignificant (p = 0.152). Apparently, nominal wages in Deflation are not adjusted to a greater extent than 
in Inflation. This finding runs contrary to our hypothesis H1a but is in line with the literature on downward 
wage stickiness. We provide a corresponding regression analysis in Table V. The model explains the 
difference between the log nominal wage adjustment and the exchange rate variation. Positive values can 
be interpreted as an adjustment in the direction of the exchange rate variation, i.e. a nominal wage increase 
by more than 10% in Inflation or a nominal wage decrease by more than 10% in Deflation. Negative values 
indicate nominal wage adjustments of less than 10% in Inflation and nominal wage adjustments larger than 
-10% in Deflation. Zero indicates a nominal wage adjustment of 10% (-10%) in Inflation (Deflation). 
 
TABLE V: WAGE INERTIA 
Failure to Adjust to exchange rate 
variation 
Coef. Robust Std.Err. P>|z| 
Constant -0.039 0.070 0.577 
Round 0.005 0.005 0.289 
Real Wage Offer -0.017 0.004 0.000 
Previous Round Real Wage Offer 0.015 0.005 0.002 
Previous Round Effort -0.000 0.002 0.934 
Inflation -0.243 0.101 0.016 
Inflation x Real Wage Offer 0.008 0.003 0.003 
Random effects regression, N = 977, Wald chi2(6) = 72.80, Prob > chi2 = 0.000, R-sq overall = 0.202; 30 groups. 
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The analysis contains the data from Inflation and Deflation. While the treatment effect (dummy variable 
Inflation) is highly negative – employers in Inflation reduce nominal wages – the difference between the 
log nominal wage adjustment and the exchange rate variation positively depends on the amount of the real 
wage offer (interaction term dummy variable Inflation and real wage offer). This makes intuitive sense, as 
a higher real wage offer necessitates a positive nominal wage adjustment in Inflation.  
We further check for treatment differences in effort adjustment. Note that average log effort adjustment 
is -0.05 for Inflation and -0.017 for Deflation, i.e. it appears that in line with our hypothesis H2a, effort 
choice adjustment is more pronounced in Inflation than in Deflation. The result of a one-sided U-test shows 
that this difference is statistically significant (p = 0.049). Apparently, employees in both treatment 
conditions downward adjust their effort choice. However, employees in Inflation show a stronger response 
as they are faced with falling real wages. 
The regression analysis in Table VI allows us to study treatment differences in effort adjustment 
following real wage changes (H2). The data shows that for each unit of a logarithmic wage increase we 
observe a logarithmic increase in effort choice by 0.531, i.e. effort choice adaptation in Deflation is less 
pronounced than a preceding real wage variation. The same holds for Inflation (H2), where the effort 
response to a preceding real wage increase is less pronounced than in Deflation. However, the reluctance 
to adjust effort choices (i.e. effort inertia) runs contrary to H2a. In H2a we conjecture that with falling real 
wages, employees will make sure to adjust their effort choices downward in Inflation. As the results in 
Table VI show, falling real wages (negative values of log real wage adjustment) lead to less pronounced 
effort adjustments in Inflation than in Deflation, i.e. with falling real wages, employees are hesitant to 
decrease their effort response (see interaction between the treatment dummy and the log real wage 
adjustment). In Deflation, employees are more prone to adjust wage offers to previous changes in the real 
wage. 
 
TABLE VI: EFFORT INERTIA 
Log Effort Adjustment Coef. Robust Std.Err. P>|z| 
Constant -0.097 0.060 0.107 
Round 0.004 0.004 0.357 
Log Real Wage Adjustment 0.531 0.093 0.000 
Inflation 0.155 0.082 0.058 
Inflation x Round -0.011 0.006 0.064 
Inflation x Log Real Wage Adjustment -0.251 0.144 0.081 
Random effects regression, Rounds 7-19, N = 941, Wald chi2(5) = 48.64, Prob > chi2 = 0.000, R-sq overall = 0.191; 30 groups. 
 
To further test for effort inertia, we need to examine the development of the relationship between real 
wages and effort choices. If effort choices are perfectly adjusted to the real wage variations, we should 
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observe real wage to effort ratios that are indistinguishable across treatments. However, the distances 
between the real wage and effort profiles in Figures I, II, and III already indicate that the real wage to effort 
ratios are different across treatments. The results of a random effects regression (see Table VII) show that 
real wage to effort ratios are largest in Deflation and lowest in Inflation, with the ratios in Control in 
between. These differences are significant. One-sided U-Tests support this finding (p = 0.001 (difference 
Control and Inflation), p = 0.008 (difference Control and Deflation), p = 0.000 (difference Inflation and 
Deflation). Figure IV provides the corresponding graphical representation. 
 
TABLE VII: REAL WAGE PER UNIT OF EFFORT 
Real Wage per Effort Unit Coef. Robust Std.Err. P>|z| 
Constant 0.739 0.075 0.000 
Round 0.005 0.005 0.340 
Inflation -0.161 0.047 0.001 
Deflation 0.162 0.057 0.004 
Random effects regression, Rounds 7-19, N = 1,567, Wald chi2 = 40.31, Prob > chi = 0.000, R-sq overall = 0.064; 45 groups. Inflation - Deflation 
= 0: chi2(1) = 37.35, Prob > chi2 = 0.000. 
 
 
FIGURE IV: REAL WAGE PER EFFORT UNIT (ALL ACCEPTED HIRES) 
 
Our results show that a unit of effort is significantly less costly in Inflation than in Control or Deflation. 
One reason for this result could be money illusion, i.e. the employees’ tendency to evaluate wage offers not 
only in real terms but also in nominal terms.14 In our game structure, nominal wage growth always leads to 
real wage growth in Control and Deflation. In Inflation, however, nominal wages may increase while real 
wages remain constant or even fall.15 A disparity between the development of nominal and real wages is 
conducive to money illusion, because subjects’ cognition may be confused by the simultaneous perception 
of a wage increase (in nominal terms) and a wage decrease (in real terms). We refer to this confusion as 
                                                 
14 Weber, Rangel, Wibral, and Falk (2009) provide neuro-economic support for money illusion. 
15 Real wages in Inflation fall when round to round nominal wage increases are smaller than 10%. 
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money illusion and conjecture that it may explain why we observe significantly smaller real labor costs in 
Inflation than in Deflation.  
To test for money illusion, we run a random effects regression with effort as the dependent variable (see 
Table VIII). We include real wage, squared real wage, round and treatment dummies into our model. These 
treatment dummies describe two situations: 1) a nominal wage gain while real wages fall and 2) a nominal 
wage loss while real wages actually rise. Note that situation 1) can only occur in Inflation while situation 
2) can only be observed in Deflation. The two treatment effects thus describe situations in which nominal 
and real wages run in different directions and, thus, open opportunities for money illusion to set in. We find 
that real wages significantly drive effort choices in all treatments. The same holds for nominal wages, but 
the effect size is very small. At the same time, a nominal wage gain that is smaller than the exchange rate 
variation (and causes a real wage cut) leads to increased effort choices. Thus, in Inflation employees seem 
to be taking nominal and real values of wages into account when deciding on their effort choice. In 
Deflation, a nominal wage cut that is smaller than the preceding exchange rate variation (and causes a real 
wage gain) decreases the effort reaction. While this is also in line with money illusion, this effect is not 
significant. Thus, we conclude that money illusion significantly drives employee decision making in 
Inflation (H3). Evidently, it is difficult for participants to pierce the nominal veil of money, although they 
are provided with a calculator enabling them to compute real consequences of nominal changes.  
 
TABLE VIII: MONEY ILLUSION IN INFLATION AND DEFLATION 
Effort  Coef. Robust Std.Err. P>|t| 
Constant 8.787 3.424 0.010 
Round -0.031 0.167 0.853 
Real Wage 8.787 0.128 0.000 
Squared Real Wage -0.005 0.001 0.000 
Deflation -9.697 2.436 0.000 
Nominal Wage Gain & Real Wage Loss 3.661 1.707 0.032 
Nominal Wage Loss & Real Wage Gain -1.895 2.686 0.480 
Random effects regression including treatments Inflation and Deflation, Rounds 7-19, N = 1,036, Wald chi2(6) = 2496.42, Prob > Prob > chi2 = 
0.000, R-sq overall = 0.711; 30 groups. 
 
B. Income distribution and unemployment 
Given that the cost of an effort unit for employers is lowest in Inflation, the question arises whether we 
can also expect their payoffs to be highest in that treatment? It turns out that the answer is mixed. In line 
with our hypothesis H4, we find employers’ payoffs (in real terms) are significantly greater in Inflation 
than in Deflation (one-sided U-Test, p = 0.000). However, we do not find a significant difference in 
employers’ payoffs comparing Inflation to Control. The reason is that the higher cost of labor in Control is 
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fully compensated by a higher productivity of labor. This is not true in Deflation where the cost of labor is 
highest, but labor productivity is not high enough to recoup the employers’ wage expenses. Hence, 
employers’ payoffs lag behind in Deflation and are also significantly smaller than in Control (one-sided U-
Test, p = 0.005).  
Our data also corroborates H5 as real employees’ earnings are significantly higher in Deflation than in 
Inflation (one-sided U-test, p = 0.000). Note that employees’ earnings in Deflation do not differ 
significantly from those in Control, while employees’ earnings in Inflation are actually significantly smaller 
than those in Control (one-sided U-test, p = 0.002). 
To gain insights into the combined effect of employees’ and employers’ earnings, we calculate the per 
capita income (in real terms) for all three treatments (e.g. the sum of all payoffs divided by four). Figure V 
shows the corresponding graph. We find that per capita earnings are significantly larger in Control than in 
Inflation (one-sided U-test, p = 0.018). At the same time, per capita earnings are also larger in Control than 
in Deflation – this difference is, however, not statistically significant. While we find treatment differences 
in employer and employee earnings between Inflation and Deflation, the aggregate effect indicates that per 
capita earnings are larger in Deflation than in Inflation (one-side U-test, p = 0.087). We conclude that per 
capita earnings are greatest in the setting with monetary stability (Control). As Figure V shows, the high 
per capita earnings in Control are embedded in a stable growth path, suggesting that monetary stability in 
a reciprocal labor relationship also supports the advancement of trust over time.  
 
  
FIGURE V: PER CAPITA EARNINGS 
 
Another aspect of income distribution concerns the number of unemployed, who generally earn less than 
the employees in labor relationships do. Table IX shows the total number of employees who were not 
offered a work contract, the number of contract offers, the number of contracts rejected by employees, and 
the number of accepted contracts. About 8% of the workers in Control and Deflation do not receive a 
contract offer. For Inflation, this number is significantly lower at about 5% (see Table X for test results). 
This supports hypothesis H6. 
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Using the data from Table IX, we can also check hypothesis H7, which states that the higher opportunity 
cost of employment in Inflation will lead to a greater number of contract rejections than in Control or 
Deflation. While we do see significantly more contract rejections in Inflation than in Control, we do not 
see a statistically significant difference between Inflation and Deflation (see Table XI for test results). 
Surprisingly, there are also significantly more contract rejections in Deflation than in Control, perhaps 
suggesting that contract rejections are not due to opportunity cost differences but due to monetary 
instability. 
 
TABLE IX: CONTRACT OFFERS AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
   Contract Offers 
Round 7-19 No Contract Offer Contract Offers Rejected Accepted 
Control 44 541 10 531 
Inflation  30 555 28 527 
Deflation 45 540 31 509 
 
 
 
 
TABLE X: TEST RESULTS CONTRACT OFFERS 
No Contract Offer: One-sided p-values chi-squared 
test (contract offers vs. no contract offer) 
Inflation Deflation 
Control 0.059 0.500 
Inflation                                    / 0.047 
 
TABLE XI: TEST RESULTS CONTRACT REJECTIONS 
Rejected work contracts: One-sided p-values chi-
squared test (rejected work contracts vs. accepted 
work contracts) 
Inflation Deflation 
Control 0.003 0.001 
Inflation / 0.353 
 
4. Conclusions 
In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the impact of monetary instability on trust-based labor 
relationships with incomplete contracts. With monetary stability, the reciprocal employer-employee 
interactions in our control treatment prove to be profitable for both players. After an initial phase of stability, 
we introduce monetary instability in our other two treatments, Inflation and Deflation, using controlled 
variations of the exchange rate between the experimental and the real currency. In Inflation, the exchange 
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rate increases by ten percent every round, letting the real value of a constant nominal wage (in experimental 
currency) decrease from one round to the next. In Deflation, the exchange rate develops in the opposite 
direction, decreasing by 10 percent per round. Consequently, the real value of a constant nominal wage (in 
experimental currency) increases from one round to the next. 
For Inflation, we find that employers do not fully adjust their nominal wage offers to the exchange rate 
variations. On average, they choose nominal wages that increase at a lower rate than inflation and, thus, 
lead to decreasing real wages. Employees, on the other hand, seem to be subject to money illusion and fail 
to fully adjust their work effort to the decreasing real wages. Thus, the inertia in adapting wages and efforts 
to the decreasing currency value results in a falling cost of labor in Inflation. Compared to our control 
treatment, the low cost of labor in Inflation increases the number of jobs offered by the employers, but also 
increases the number of labor contracts rejected by potential employees. Hence, inflation pushes real wages 
down, decreases the cost of labor, but increases the shirking on the job and the voluntary unemployment. 
In total, inflation has a negative impact on productivity in our experiment.  
In Deflation, we also observe an overall negative effect of wage and effort inertia on per capita earnings, 
but through a different path than in Inflation. While inflation creates opportunities for self-interested 
behavior by the employers, deflation does so for the employees. The reluctance of employers to cut nominal 
wages to the same extent as the currency devaluates (i.e. wage inertia) leads to increasing real wages in 
Deflation. However, since the employees do not fully adjust their effort choices to the increasing real wage 
(i.e. effort inertia), the cost of labor rises sharply and reaches the highest levels that we observe among our 
three treatments. Because the high cost of labor is not fully compensated with high effort levels, employer 
earnings are low and their reluctance to offer labor contracts grows. Hence, deflation pushes real wages 
upwards, shifts income from employers to employees, and affects per capita earnings negatively without 
revealing any clear economic advantage. 
Overall, we find monetary instability detrimental to productivity and per capita earnings when labor 
contracts are incomplete and work relationships are based on reciprocity. The reluctance of individuals to 
quickly and fully adapt their wage and effort choices to the changing value of the currency (i.e. wage and 
effort inertia) affects the payoff distribution and, thus, disrupts the trust relationship between employers 
and employees. As usual, disrupted trust in reciprocal work relationships leads to reduced effort provision 
and a decline of the per capita income. Hence, our experiment unambiguously points at monetary stability 
as the most favorable setting for sustained productivity and income in reciprocal work relationships. 
Our results indicate that firms predominantly operating based on reciprocal work relationships (e.g. due 
to incomplete labor contracts) will seek to minimize monetary instability. For example, they may lobby for 
a stable currency or move their operations to locations with stable currencies. Alternatively, employers and 
employees may seek to use indexed wage contracts that eradicate wage inertia, hoping that this will relieve 
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the work relationship from the negative effects of monetary instability. However, indexed wages can only 
solve the problem, if they are non-renegotiable. Otherwise, monetary instability will destabilize these 
employment contracts, because employers have short-term incentives to renegotiate the contract terms in 
periods of inflation (i.e. when the indexed nominal wages rise) and because employees have short-term 
incentives to renege on the contracts in periods of deflation (i.e. when the indexed nominal wages decline). 
While our study seems to suggest that exogenously implemented monetary stability offers the best 
environment for economic prosperity when work relationships are based on reciprocal exchange, further 
research is needed to clarify whether indexed wage contracts present a successful alternative to exogenous 
monetary stability. 
Clearly, the aggregate effects on productivity and income distribution that we find are only part of the 
whole story. One the one hand, our model does not include all features of labor contracts present in the 
field. On the other hand, our experiment is not intended to capture all potential sources of wage inertia that 
the literature has uncovered.16 However, our findings clearly show that the behavioral rigidities that we 
observe in our experiment (i.e. the reluctance to fully adjust wages and effort choices to alterations of the 
currency value) can be sufficient to trigger real distortion effects of monetary instability, even in absence 
of all other suggested causes of nominal rigidities, such as contractual or institutional rigidities. 
 
  
                                                 
16 Given the fact that we only study one of the possible sources, wage inertia may actually be even more pronounced in reality than it already 
is in our experiment. 
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Appendix 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study of the labor market and you are able to earn money in this experiment. 
Your payoff will be calculated in Talers during the experiment. At the end of the experiment, these Talers 
will be converted into Euros. You will receive your cash earnings after the end of the experiment. 
Please not that you may only interact with the other participants of the experiment through the computer 
software. Other types of communication are not allowed and you may be expelled from the experiment for 
engaging in other forms of communication. 
You will be randomly assigned to groups of 4. Within each group, there are one employer and three 
employees. You will know your role from your computer’s start screen. This 4-person constellation will be 
maintained until the end of the experiment. The labor market in the experiment lasts for 20 rounds. Be 
aware that you will be interacting with the same employer and the same employees during each of these 20 
rounds. 
Your decisions are processed automatically and your payoff is calculated automatically. Your payoff at 
the end of the experiment is the sum over all payoffs that you receive during the rounds of the experiment. 
In the course of the experiment, the exchange rate between Talers and Euros may change. You find the 
current exchange rate on your computer screen. 
 
Information concerning the labor market 
 At the beginning of each round, the employer decides which of the 3 employees to hire. Every hire i 
receives a wage offer of 0iw Talers. The non-hires receive an unemployment benefit. The employer 
may differentiate between the employees, i.e. each employee may receive an individual wage offer. Each 
hire will learn his individual wage offer and the total number of hires. 
 After the hires know their wage offers, each hire decides individually whether and how much to work.  
 The effort choice is connected to a cost of effort. Low work effort costs less than high work effort. The 
employee’s choice, whether and how much to work, is forwarded to the employer. 
 
Calculation of round income in Talers – employee 
 If employee i decides to reject the wage offer, his payoff equals 0 Talers during this round of the 
experiment. 
 If employee i decides to accept the wage offer and chooses an effort level ei, he receives the wage offer 
from which the cost of effort will be deducted. 
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 Employee i decides how much effort to supply by choosing an effort level between 10 and 100 percent. 
Where 10 percent is the smallest possible work effort and 100 percent is the highest work effort. 
 The cost of effort depends on the effort choice in a way that low effort costs less than high effort.  
 The round payoff of employee i amounts to: 





iii
i Employee elevel  effort an choosesi  employee if)e(cw
offer wage the rejectsi  employee if
Payoff
0  
 Every participant can use the income calculator to compute—for different effort choices (you may enter 
every integer value between 10 and 100)—the cost of effort and the corresponding employee and 
employer earnings. 
 At the end of the round, each employee gets to know his own round payoff and the employer’s round 
payoff from the work relationship. The payoffs will be shown in Talers and Euros. 
 If an employee is not hired during a round, he will earn an unemployment benefit of 5 Talers. The 
unemployment benefit will be adjusted to the exchange rate in a way that the Euro value will remain the 
same over all rounds. 
 An employer, who is not hired during a round, may be re-hired by the employer in the next round. 
 
Calculation of round income in Talers – employer  
 The employer decides which employees to hire during every round. 
 The employer only receives payoffs from work relationships, i.e. from the collaboration with hired 
employees. 
 At the beginning of each round, the employer decides on a wage offer 0iw in Talers for every hire. 
 The highest possible wage offer is restricted to the highest benefit the employer may potentially receive 
from the employee’s effort choice. During round 1, this value is 100. It will be adjusted to changes in 
the exchange rate. 
 If employee i decides not to work for the wage offer, the employer receives a payoff of 0 from the work 
relationship during this round. The employer may, however, receive earnings from the other work 
relationships during the round. This depends on the decisions of the other hires. 
 If employee i chooses a work effort, the employer receives the following payoff from the work 
relationship: 
iiEmployer wxPayoff   
 Where xi is the benefit that the employer receives from employee i’s effort choice in Talers. At the 
beginning of the experiment this values equals employee i’s effort choice ei. The value will be 
automatically adjusted to the exchange rate such that its Euro value remains constant over all rounds. 
 The round payoff of the employer is the sum over all payoffs from the different work relationships. 
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 At the end of each round, the employer learns the effort choices, the corresponding wage offers, the 
different employees‘ payoffs and the employer payoff. Payoffs are displayed in Talers and in Euros. 
 Please be aware that the employer incurs a loss whenever the wage offer is too high given the effort 
choice. The computer program will display losses as a negative number (minus sign). If the employer 
tries to offer a wage that is so high that even the highest possible work effort will lead to a negative 
employer payoff, the computer program will ask the employer to adjust the wage offer. 
 
Exchange rate in the experiment 
 The computer program includes an exchange rate calculator. Therefore, you may compute the Euro 
value of different amounts of Talers. 
 The exchange rate of Talers to Euros may vary during the experiment.  
 If the exchange rate of Talers to Euro increases from one round to the next, a Taler will be worth fewer 
Euros during the current round than it used to be in the previous round. To compensate for this, the cost 
of effort and the benefit the employer receives from the employee’s effort choice will be increased such 
that their Euro values remain constant. 
 If the exchange rate of Talers to Euros falls from one round to the next, a Taler will be worth more Euros 
during the current round than it used to be in the previous round. To compensate for this, the cost of 
effort and the benefit the employer receives from the employee’s effort choice will be decreased such 
that their Euro values remain constant. 
 Accordingly, the same wage offer is worth less Euros in a round with a higher exchange rate than in a 
round with a lower exchange rate. Wage offers are not automatically adjusted to the exchange rate. 
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